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in accord with the intended reading of EPTL § 5-4.3. When the
legislature first enacted the wrongful death statute ' it was free to
place restrictions on the right to recover.17 ' Moreover, judicial interpretation of "pecuniary injuries" to exclude loss of society and consortium has not prompted legislative response, suggesting a reluctance to broaden the elements of recovery in wrongful death actions.
It is submitted that if change in the traditional New York rule is to
occur, it should come from the legislature.
Elaine Robinson McHale

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

N. Y. U.C. C. § 3-206,-405: Drawer has cause of action against
depositary bank for failure to act in accordance with a restrictive
indorsement
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) contains various provisions which seek both to foster the negotiability of commercial
paper'7 2 and to place the risk of loss of the party who should most
appropriately bear it .' 3 Thus, under the "imposter rule" of section
N.Y.S.2d at 119. Another second department panel has extensively reviewed the history of
the wrongful death action in New York and has noted that the constitutional provision that
protects the statutorily created wrongful death action, see note 149 supra, "left undisturbed
the other then existing limitation in the statute allowing recovery only of pecuniary damages
which the courts of this State had interpreted as barring damages for grief, loss of society
and suffering of survivors." Amerman v. Lizza & Sons, Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 996, 998, 358
N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (2d Dep't 1974).
170The constitutional limitations on the legislature's right to limit recoverable damages
under the wrongful death statute were not adopted until 1894. See note 149 supra.
M7Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579 (1974); 2 F. HIAPER & F. JAMEs,
LAW OF TORTS § 24.1, at 1285 (1956).
M Section 3-104(1) lists the prerequisites of negotiability. The instrument must be
signed by the maker or drawer, promise unconditionally the payment in money of a sum
certain on demand or at a definite time, and be payable to order or to bearer. These prerequisites are discussed in detail elsewhere in the Code. See N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 3-105 to -107, -109, 112 to -114 (McKinney 1964).
'71 Section 3-406, for example, provides that the party whose negligence "substantially"
contributes to the alteration of an instrument or to the unauthorized affixing of a signature
thereon shall, if the drawee pays in good faith, bear the burden of the resulting loss. Section
3-418 codifies the rule of Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762), which held that money paid
out by an innocent drawee on an instrument bearing a forged signature may not be recovered
from a holder in due course or an innocent purchaser who is able to show detrimental reliance.
Section 3-419 delineates the circumstances whereby an instrument is deemed converted and
allocates liability therefor. Subsection 3 limits the conversion liability of depositary and other
collecting banks to the infrequent instances when the bank holds the proceeds of an instrument, fails to act in good faith or in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, or
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3-405, where an employee furnishes his employer, as drawer, with
the name of a payee, intending the payee to have no interest in the
instrument, the employee's unauthorized indorsement is deemed
effective for purposes of negotiation."' Since the drawer is deemed
to be in a better position than the drawee to prevent such forgeries,
the risk of loss is placed on the drawer. 7 5 Similarly, section 3-206,
which recognizes that the collection of commercial paper would be
impeded were all banks in the collection process 17 required to investigate restrictive indorsements 7 other than those of their immediate transferor, imposes a duty of inquiry solely on depbsitary
banks. 178 In Underpinning& FoundationConstructors,Inc. v. Chase
cashes a check over a restrictive indorsement. See J. WHrrE &R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 504-05 (West 1972) [hereinafter cited as WHTE
& SUMMERS], and the cases cited therein for a critique of § 3-419(3)'s solicitousness of the
financial resources of banks.
"IT
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-405 (McKinney 1964) provides, in pertinent part, that "[ain indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective if. . .an agent or employee
of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the name of the payee intending the latter to
have no such interest." Section 3-405 is the exception to the general rule that payment on an
unauthorized or forged indorsement is equivalent to conversion of the instrument.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c) (McKinney 1964); see, e.g., Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126
N.Y. 318, 327, 27 N.E. 371, 372-73 (1891); Commercial Trading Co. v. Trade Bank & Trust
Co., 286 App. Div. 722, 726, 146 N.Y.S.2d 570, 574-75 (1st Dep't 1955); R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-404:12 to :14 (2d ed. 1971).
15 The Official Comment to N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-405 states:
The principle followed is that the loss should fall upon the employer as a risk of
his business enterprise rather than upon the subsequent holder or drawee. The
reasons are that the employer is normally in a better position to prevent such
forgeries by reasonable care in the selection or supervision of his employees, or, if
he is not, is at least in a better position to cover the loss by fidelity insurance; and
that the cost of such insurance is properly an expense of his business rather than
of the business of the holder or drawee.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-405, Official Comment (4) (McKinney 1964); see New York Law Revision
Commission Study of the Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3-Commercial Paper (1955) 2
N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP. 1000-09; R. ANDERSON, supra note 174, § 3-405:6.
7I Banks in the collection process include the depositary bank, which is "the first bank
to which an item is transferred for collection even though it is also the payor bank,"
N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-105(a) (McKinney 1964), the payor bank, which is "a bank by which an item
is payable as drawn or accepted," id. § 4-105(b) (McKinney 1964), and the intermediary
bank, which is "any bank to which an item is transferred in course of collection except the
depositary or payor bank," id. § 4-105(c) (McKinney 1964).
An indorsement is restrictive which either
(a) is conditional; or
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument; or
(c) includes the words "for collection," "for deposit", "pay any bank",
or like terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection; or
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit or use of the indorser or of
another person.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-205 (McKinney 1964).
" Section 3-206(2) provides:
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ManhattanBank N.A.,'7 the Appellate Division, First Department,
recently had occasion to consider an unusual instance involving the
interplay of the imposter rule and section 3-206 and held that a
drawer has a cause of action against a depositary bank which neglects to apply proceeds of restrictively indorsed checks according to
their tenor. ' °
Underpinning & Foundation Constructors, Inc., relying on false
invoices prepared by an employee, drew ten checks to the order of
vendors and suppliers from which it customarily made purchases. 8 '
The employee then restrictively indorsed the checks to the named
payees and presented them for deposit in accounts maintained by
the employee at the Bank of New York (BNY) .112 Despite the restrictive indorsements, BNY accepted the checks and credited the accounts of the employee.1 3 Underpinning brought suit alleging that
in failing to apply the proceeds of the checks consistently with the
An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the depositary bank, is
neither given notice nor otherwise affected by a restrictive indorsement of any
person except the bank's immediate transferor or the person presenting for payment.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-206(2) (McKinney 1964).
The drafters' intent that restrictive indorsements be given effect as against depositary
banks is further evidenced by § 3-603(1)(b), which provides that a depositary bank which
pays or satisfies a holder in contravention of a restrictive indorsement is not discharged from
liability on the instrument. N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-603(1)(b) (McKinney 1964).
Moreover, § 3-419(3) imposes liability for conversion upon a depositary bank which fails
to pay or apply the proceeds of a restrictively indorsed instrument in accordance with the
indorsement. The theory is that, in light of the immense volume of checks handled by banks
in the chain of collection, only the depositary bank should be expected to examine the checks
for irregularities. As stated in the Official Comment to § 3-206, intermediary banks, and
payor banks which are not depositary banks, "ordinarily handle instruments, especially
checks, in bulk and have no practicable opportunity to consider the effect of restrictive
indorsements." N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-206, Official Comment 3 (McKinney 1964); see WHrrE &
SUMMERS, supra note 173, at 499-509.
Under the former New York rule, collecting and payor banks were also under a duty to
act consistently with the terms of a restrictive indorsement. See Negotiable Instruments Law
§§ 67, 69, ch. 336, § 7, [1898] N.Y. Laws 973, ch. 612, § 67, [1897] N.Y. Laws 729 (current
version at N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 3-414, 3-417 (McKinney 1964)); Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223,
232, 14 N.E.2d 46, 49-50 (1938). The effect of the Soma decision was to impose liability upon
any bank in the stream of collection which failed to abide by the terms of a restrictively
indorsed instrument. See generally New York Revision Commission Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Article 3-Commercial Paper, [1955] 2 N.Y. LAW Rv. COMM'N REP. 9899, 859-69; Penney, A Summary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in New York, 48
CORNELL L.Q. 47, 56-57 (1962).
" 61 App. Div. 2d 628, 403 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1st Dep't 1978).
Id. at 630-31, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
,i, Id. at 629, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
15

55 Id. It is not clear from the court's summary of the facts why the checks had been
restrictively indorsed.
"1 Id. at 629, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 501-02.
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restrictive indorsements, BNY breached the standard of care imposed on depositary banks by section 3-206.' 1 BNY's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action was denied by the
Supreme Court, New York County.'85
On appeal, a divided appellate division affirmed the lower
court's ruling, holding that the depositary bank's duty of care ran
to the drawer of the restrictively indorsed checks. 86 Writing for the
majority,' 7 Justice Yesawich noted that while intermediary collecting banks generally are not subject to liability for failing to inquire
when presented with an instrument containing a restrictive iridorsement, both the common law and section 3-206 impose such liability
on depositary banks.' s8 Reasoning that the absence of privity of
contract should not bar a direct action by a drawer against a depositary bank which fails to inquire when presented with a restrictive
indorsement,5" the court concluded that "the beneficiary of a depositary bank's duty to make that inquiry is any party harmed by the
''9°
bank's failure to do so.
18 Id. Underpinning also alleged that BNY's failure to inquire when presented with the
checks for deposit constituted gross negligence. Id.
I' Id., 403 N.Y.S.2d at 502.

Id. at 630-31, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
Justice Birns joined Justice Yesawich in the majority opinion. Justice Sandler concurred in a separate opinion.
1" 61 App. Div. 2d at 630, 403 N.Y.S,2d at 502.
,81
In rejecting the contention that the absence of privity of contract precludes a cause
of action by the drawer, the court spoke in terms" of broad tort liability attaching to the
negligent depositary bank and found a duty running to those whose injury was proximately
caused by the defendant's act. Id. at 631, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 503. The law in New York has been
that no privity of contract exists between the drawer of a check and the collecting bank. The
Court of Appeals has held that "a collecting bank is merely an agent for the purpose of
collecting from the drawee bank the proceeds of the check delivered to it." Henderson v.
Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 33, 100 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1938). Applying this
reasoning, where a check has been paid on a forged indorsement the drawer's remedy lies in
an action against the drawee bank, which in turn may seek indemnification from the collecting bank. See note 190 infra. Similarly, in the landmark case of Stone & Webster Eng. Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962), the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachussets held that a drawer may not sue a depositary bank in conversion for
cashing and passing on a check which was stolen from the drawer. This view is premised on
the grounds that a drawer has no "valuable rights" in an undelivered check, that the drawee
bank is in a better position than the depositary bank to assert against the drawer the defense
of negligence and, that there is no privity of contract between the drawer and the depositary
bank.
110
61 App. Div. 2d at 630, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 502. The court acknowledged that New York
courts have not recognized a cause of action by a drawer against a collecting bank when an
instrument bears the forged indorsement of the payee. Id. at 631, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03;
see Trojan Publishing Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 298 N.Y. 771, 773, 83 N.E.2d 465,
466 (1948) (mem.); Titan Air Conditioning Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 App. Div.
2d 764, 765, 402 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.); Brokerage Data Processing Corp.
v. Eastchester Say. Bank, 39 App. Div. 2d 895, 895, 334 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (1st Dep't 1972)
'
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Dissenting at length, 9 ' Justice Lupiano observed that no cause
of action accrues in favor of a drawer against a depositary bank
which collects on a check bearing the forged indorsement of the
payee. 9 ' The dissent noted that such actions are precluded due to
the absence of privity between the parties.'9 3 Generally, Justice Lupiano reasoned, a depositary bank's liability for paying on a forged
indorsement is limited to either the wronged payee"9 4 or the drawee
(mem.); Low v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 322, 323.24, 266 N.Y.S.2d
74, 75-76 (3d Dep't 1966); Chartered Bank v. American Trust Co., 48 Misc. 2d 314, 316-17,
264 N.Y.S.2d 656, 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); Aritor Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
39 Misc. 2d 427, 428, 240 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963). The Underpinning
court distinguished Low v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 322, 266
N.Y.S.2d 74 (3d Dep't 1966), which involved a suit by a drawer against a depositary bank
for crediting an account, other than that of the named payee, with the proceeds of restrictively
indorsed checks. 61 App. Div. 2d at 631, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 503. The Low court held that since
no privity of contract existed between the drawer and the collecting bank, the plaintiff's
action, if any, lay against the drawee bank. See note 189 supra. In the Low situation, either
the drawee bank or the payee has an action against the collecting bank. 24 App. Div. 2d at
324, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 76 (citing Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100
N.E.2d 117 (1951); Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E.2d 46 (1938); City of New York
v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E. 495 (1933)). For a description of the
warranties made by customers and collecting banks when transferring or presenting items,
see note 195 infra. The Underpinning court distinguished Low on the grounds that the latter
case was not argued on the basis of § 3-206. 61 App. Div. 2d at 631, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
In a concurring opinion;, Justice Sandler stressed the Code's treatment of the duty of
depositary banks with respect to restrictive indorsements. 61 App. Div. 2d at 631-32, 403
N.Y.S.2d at 503-04 (Sandler, J., concurring). The impact of § 3-206 in preserving the depositary bank's duty of inquiry, see note 178 supra, coupled with the bank's liability in conversion
for failure to pay a restrictively indorsed instrument according to its tenor, see N.Y.U.C.C. §
3-419(3), (4) (McKinney 1964), seemed to Justice Sandler to import a lack of intent on the
part of the Code's draftsmen to deny to the drawer an action against the depositary bank. 61
App. Div. 2d at 632,403 N.Y.S.2d at 504 (Sandier, J., concurring). Section 3-419 (4) provides:
An intermediary bank or payor bank which is not a depositary bank is not
liable in conversion solely by reason of the fact that proceeds of an item indorsed
restrictively are not paid or applied consistently with the restrictive indorsement
of an indorser other than its immediate transferor.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419(4) (McKinney 1964) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Code is
in fact silent as to the beneficiary of the depositary bank's duty of inquiry. See In re Quantum
Dev. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 329, 336 (D.V.I. 1975), in which the court notes:
No section of the Uniform Commercial Code specifically requires an indorseebank to examine the [restrictive indorsement] and to ensure that its payment is
not inconsistent therewith; nor does any provision set forth any liability on the part
of a bank for payment inconsistent with a restrictive indorsement. But. . . such
duty and resulting liability for the failure to carry out such duty can be fairly
inferred from a number of Code sections.
M92
Presiding Justice Murphy concurred in the dissenting opinion of Justice Lupiano.
29M 61 App. Div. 2d at 634-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05 (Lupiano, J., dissenting); see note
190 supra.
HI 61 App. Div. 2d at 634-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05 (Lupiano, J., dissenting); see
Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. at 33, 100 N.E.2d at 120.
"IoSee, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162
(1968), aff'd, 105 N.J. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (1969); E. Mach Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div.
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bank. In the instant case, however, no action would accrue in favor
of the named payee since it was not intended to have any interest
in the instrument. More importantly since the imposter rule shields
the drawee bank from liability to the drawer,'95 the former would
suffer no loss for which it could seek indemnification from the depositary bank.' 6 Thus, notwithstanding the provisions of section 3206, the possibility of section 3-405 barring an action by the plaintiff
against the drawee bank, declared the dissent, does not justify sustaining an action against the depositary bank.'97 Such a result was
thought to be contrary both to the rule governing forged iridorsement cases and to the intent of the UCC's draftsmen in placing the
'
risk of loss on the drawer of the instrument under section 3-405. 98
It appears that the Underpinningmajority erred in restricting
its inquiry to the question whether section 3-206 was drafted with
an eye towards affording the drawer a remedy against the depositary
bank. Generally, the only occasion when the drawer would seek to
bring an action against the depositary bank would be when the imposter rule operates to bar a successful suit against the drawee
bank. The critical question, which was not acknowledged by the
Underpinning majority, is whether the loss which the imposter
rule allocates to the drawer should be shifted to the depositary
bank by virtue of section 3-206.
In imposing liability on the depositary bank, the Underpinning
court failed to consider the shifting of loss which the imposter rule
mandates. A forged indorsement "is wholly inoperative as that of
the person whose name is signed"' 9 and if a bank pays on such an
instrument it is liable in conversion."0 Under the imposter rule of
section 3-405, however, where an employee of the drawer causes an
instrument to be made payable to a payee, intending such payee to
have no interest in the instrument, a subsequent "forged" indorse842, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (1st Dep't 1917), affl'd, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919); Niagara Woolen
Co. v. Pacific Bank, 141 App. Div. 265, 126 N.Y.S. 890 (1st Dep't 1910).
"1 61 App. Div. 2d at 642-44, 403 N.Y.S.2d 510-11. N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-207 (McKinney 1964)
provides that a collecting bank warrants, inter alia, good title and genuineness of signatures.
See WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 173, at 509-14 (1972).
"I See N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-405 (McKinney 1964). Since Underpinning'swrongdoing employee supplied it with the name of the payee, and since it is apparent that the employee
intended such payee to have interest in the instrument, the imposter rule seems clearly
applicable. Although never discussed by the majority, this was believed by the dissent to form
the unspoken predicate for the court's holding. 61 App. Div. 2d at 642-44, 403 N.Y.S.2d at
510-11; see R. ANDERSON, supra note 174, § 3-419:9 (operation of imposter rule bars actions
by drawers against drawees or depositary banks).
1'7
61 App. Div. 2d at 642-44, 403 N.Y.S. at 510-11.
"I Id. at 641-44, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 509-11.
1,,
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (McKinney 1964).
2 Id. § 3-419(1)(c) (McKinney 1964); see note 3 supra.
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ment made by the employee in the payee's name is effective.0 1
Thus, if a bank pays on such an instrument it is not liable in conversion since the employer is made to bear the risk of loss."' In
Underpinning,the employee did not merely indorse the instrument
in the payee's name; rather, he restrictively indorsed it. This event,
although sufficient in the court's view to give the drawer a cause of
action against the depositary bank, should not alter the legal result
obtaining from the imposter rule. Since section 3-405 was drafted
with the object of imposing risk of loss upon the drawer,2" 3 the
Underpinning result is inconsistent with the intent of the drafters
of the Code.
Bruce A. Antonelli
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Declarationagainst penal interest held inadmissible against
defendant in criminal action
In People v. Brown,"4 the Court of Appeals expanded the declaration against interest exception to include a declaration against
penal interest offered by a defendant in a criminal case.25 The
N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-405 (McKinney 1964); see notes 174-75 supra.
- N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-405 (McKinney 1964). An argument might be made, however, that
even where the imposter rule applies, if a bank acts contrary to reasonable commercial
practices and pays inconsistently with the terms of a restrictive indorsement, the drawer
should be allowed to assert such negligence and shift the loss to the payor bank. Under §§ 3406 and 4-406, if both the bank and its customer are shown to have been negligent with respect
to instruments which have been altered or signed without authorization, the resulting loss is
borne by the bank. N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-406 (McKinney 1964); see WHrrE & SUMMERS,
supra note 173, at 548-49.
See R. ANDERSON, supranote 174, §§ 3-405:6,-505:3.
26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970).
20 It had been the settled rule in New York that the declaration against interest exception only included declarations against one's pecuniary or proprietary interest. See, e.g.,
Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 175-76, 155 N.E. 88, 90 (1926); Ellwanger v. Whitefold,
15 App. Div. 2d 898, 898-99, 225 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (lst Dep't 1962) (per curiam), aff'd mem.,
12 N.Y.2d 1037, 190 N.E.2d 24, 239 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1963). See generally W. RICHARDSON,
EVIDENCE §§ 255-266 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973); see also People v. Sullivan, 43 App. Div. 2d
55, 349 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1st Dep't 1973) (per curiam). Professor Wigmore persuasively urged
American courts to "discard this barbarous doctrine [precluding the admission of declarations against penal interest], which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself
even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the
very gallows, by the true culprit now beyond the reach of justice ....
" 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1477, at 290 (3d ed. 1940).
In the Brown case, the defendant was on trial for murder and asserted that he had killed
the victim in self-defense. 26 N.Y.2d at 90, 257 N.E.2d at 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 826. Although
201

